Introduction
Over the past two decades, income inequality in the U.S. has increased, causing the share of income taxable by Social Security to decrease and harming the program's finances. At the same time, dramatic changes in the U.S. labor market have occurred, with a sharp increase in the automation of tasks that were once performed by workers and an increase in competition from abroad through trade. These changes have not impacted all workers in the same way. Some labor markets sustained a much more direct hit from automation and trade than others, and some jobs within these markets are more sensitive to such shocks than others. How much has the unequal distribution of these impacts contributed to the well-documented increase in earnings inequality and to the subsequent decline in the taxable share? To answer this question, this paper brings Social Security administrative data on earnings together with an analysis based on the recent literature on automation and trade.
The taxable share of earnings plays an important role in Social Security's finances. The Social Security Trust Fund is sustained by a 12.4 percent tax on payroll; however, this tax is levied only on annual earnings below a ceiling known as the "taxable maximum." Earnings above this cap are not subject to the payroll tax, nor do they enter a beneficiary's benefit calculation. While this arrangement, on the surface, should have no effect on the program's finances, since both revenue and benefits are reduced, in fact a reduction in the share of taxable earnings harms program finances in two ways. First, the progressivity of the benefit formula means that the reduction in benefits due to the exclusion of earnings above the cap may not be commensurate with the foregone revenue. Second, even though earnings above the cap do not factor into benefit calculations for their earners, these earnings do enter into the calculation of the Average Wage Index (AWI), which is used to inflate the earnings of all beneficiaries.
Given the harm to the program from a declining taxable share, it is troubling that this 2016) ; Kopczuk, Saez, and Song (2007); and Bakija, Cole, and Heim (2010) .
Despite its importance to both Social Security and to the equity of the economy generally, the reasons for the increase in earnings at the top of the distribution are not well understood. Hypothesized mechanisms include skill-biased technological change (Autor, Katz, and Kearney 2006) ; technologies fostering "superstars" (Rosen 1981 ) and a corresponding increase in executive pay (Kostiuk 1990; Bebchuk and Fried 2003; Bebchuk and Grinstein 2005; Gabaix and Landier 2008; Frydman and Jenter 2010; and Frydman and Saks 2010) ; increasing labor-market concentration (Azar, Marinescu, and Steinbaum 2017; Benmelech, Bergman, and Kim 2018, and Naidu, Posner, and Weyl forthcoming) ; the decline of countervailing labormarket institutions such as unions (DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux 1996; Levy and Temin 2007; and Farber et al. 2018) ; and the erosion of norms regarding pay inequality in English-speaking countries (Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez 2011) . This paper focuses on two well-identified factors that have been hypothesized to contribute to the recent increase in the top share of earnings and for which the literature has developed straightforward measures: 1) automation, measured by industrial robots per 1,000 workers (following Acemoglu and Restrepo 2017, henceforth "AR"); and 2) trade, as measured by imports from China (following Autor, Dorn, and Hanson 2013, henceforth "ADH") . 2 The analysis relies on data from the Social Security Administration's Continuous Work History Sample (CWHS) for wage and salary earners to calculate the earnings distributions in 1994 and in 2015. These data provide administrative earnings records for a large sample that should be more accurate than self-reported earnings; furthermore, these records are not top-coded as most surveys are, allowing analysis of the very top of the earnings distribution.
The analysis combines the CWHS data with industry-level automation and trade measures calculated by AR and ADH, respectively. These measures are instrumented by the industry-level penetration of industrial robots and Chinese imports in other developed countries' industries, as in AR and ADH, in order to prevent bias in the estimates due to local shocks in the United States. With these data, instrumental variables quantile regressions are estimated for every earnings decile up to the 80 th percentile and for every percentile above that to the 99 th to account for how the association between the two factors and earnings changes at different points in the distribution.
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The analysis shows that increases in automation and trade have generally had negative effects on earnings throughout the distribution. Trade has a monotonically decreasing (in absolute value) effect across the earnings distribution. Automation, in contrast, displays a Ushaped pattern consistent with the labor-market polarization associated with skill-biased technological change found in previous literature. 4 However, the effects of automation are still distinctly negative even approaching the top 1-percent of earners, consistent with AR's findings that automation negatively impacts even high earners.
Despite the divergent patterns for the two factors, both together impacted the lower and middle parts of the earnings distribution more negatively than the extreme upper part, contributing to the increasing share of earnings accruing to the highest earners. Using the estimates from the regressions, the analysis calculates a counterfactual 2015 earnings distribution had these factors remained at their 1994 levels. This counterfactual reveals that the two factors alone accounted for about 15 percent of the increase in the top 1-percent share of total earnings, and about 11 percent of the decline in the taxable share of total earnings (0.4 percentage points of the 3.4 percentage point decline) between 1994 and 2015.
The vast majority of the effect on top-earner shares is due to trade. Automation had negative impacts across a broad swath of even high earners, and thus had a very small effect on the shares of earnings accruing to the top few percentiles. The remainder of the differences between the top 1-percent shares and taxable shares in 1994 and 2015 is likely attributable to factors which are harder to quantify or estimate. Such factors include increasing market concentration, the erosion of norms surrounding managerial compensation, and an increasing share of compensation paid as untaxable benefits.
Other aspects of skill-biased technological change outside of industrial automation and growing trade with other nations besides China likely also contribute to increased earnings inequality. Industrial robots and imports from China make up a relatively small share of total 3 The higher resolution of the estimates in the top quintile of the distribution is in recognition of the fact that the share of earnings going to top earners is the main driver of changes in the taxable share of earnings. The methodology is based on methods described in Chernozhukov and Hansen (2005) and Chernozhukov, FernandezVal, and Melly (2013) . 4 See, for example, Kearney (2006 and ; Acemoglu and Autor (2011); . This literature stresses that technological change may allow substitution of routine tasks, mostly affecting middle-earning jobs, and having less effect on non-routine jobs in both low-and high-earnings service industries. The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The second section describes the determination of the taxable share, how it is affected by changes in the earnings distribution, and its implications for Social Security's finances. The third section describes the four main data sources used in the analysis. The fourth section describes the methodological approach. The fifth section presents the results of the analysis and discusses the implications for the taxable share. The final section concludes that increases in automation and, particularly, trade modestly contributed to the decline in the taxable share, and that further increases in these and related factors are likely to worsen Social Security's long-run fiscal situation.
Background
This section first provides background on a key determinant of the taxable ratio: the cap on taxable earnings. More detail is then provided on how the taxable share affects Social Security's finances.
The Cap on Taxable Earnings
The cap on taxable earnings limits the contributions and benefits of Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) of high earners, presumably because they are likely to have private savings and unlikely to rely on such benefits (Mulvey 2010 Despite the mechanical adjustment of the wage base with the AWI, the taxable share has been roughly countercyclical in the past few decades (see Figure 1 ). This pattern arises because recent periods of expansion have benefited those earning above the cap more than those earning below it, and recent recessions have had the opposite impacts (Piketty and Saez, 2013) .
Furthermore, in recent decades the taxable share has declined to a lower nadir with every subsequent expansion, tracking the progressively increasing peaks in top-earner shares of earnings. In line with these historical patterns, as the current economic recovery entered its 5 Calculating the share of earnings above the cap before that year requires aggregating earnings across multiple employers of the same individual. 6 The formula has a few quirks. One is that if the AWI decreases, the cap is not reduced. Another is that the formula only applies at all in a year in which OASDI benefits are subjected to a Cost of Living Adjustment. Indeed, in 2016 there was no Cost of Living Adjustment due to negligible inflation as measured by the Consumer Price Index (CPI). This was despite an increase in the AWI in that year. Consequently in 2017, once a COLA was applied to benefits again, the increase in the cap was extraordinarily large, at 7.3 percent, as it accounted for two years' worth of growth in average wages. 7 The adjustment of the taxable maximum with AWI means that increases in the earnings of workers earning above the cap have an ambiguous effect on the share of taxable earnings. On the one hand, such earnings are not taxed, by definition. On the other hand, such earnings do contribute to a rising AWI, which in turn raises the cap and brings more earnings below it. Intuitively, then, the taxable share declines most when growth in earnings above the cap is offset by a decline in earnings below the cap, such that the AWI is unchanged. In other words, the taxable share would be most impacted by a mean-preserving spread of the earnings distribution that increases inequality not only by raising earnings for those at the top, but also reducing them for those at the bottom. The first way that earnings above the cap affect Social Security's long-term finances is that those earnings still enter into the calculation of the AWI. The AWI is used in calculating benefits for all workers, including those with earnings below the taxable cap. Thus an increase in the AWI due to the earnings of high earners raises the benefits for all beneficiaries without directly contributing any revenue to cover those added costs.
The second way in which earnings above the cap hurt Social Security's long-term fiscal situation is through the progressivity of the OASDI benefit formula. If the AWI is held constant, a decline in the taxable share by necessity implies a decline in lower earners' earnings. The progressivity of the benefit formula means that benefits for low earners may not decline proportionally to the revenue lost from their lower earnings.
As a consequence of these two channels, increased earnings above the cap are a burden on the OASDI program's long-term finances. In addition, there is a temporary hit to program finances from a reduction in the taxable share, since it reduces revenues immediately, while its effect on reducing benefits is only slowly realized.
The is an important task. The next section introduces the data needed to perform that task.
Data
The empirical analysis in this paper relies on four main datasets, which are combined to estimate the effects of automation and trade on the earnings distribution.
Automation
As a measure of automation, the analysis uses the operationalization developed by AR, which is based on the number of robots per 1,000 workers, calculated for 19 different industries.
Although the current analysis is focused on the U.S. earnings distribution, the paper uses an instrumental variables approach, where U.S. automation is instrumented by automation in
European countries (as in AR). 9 Specifically, the instrument for a given U.S. state is the level of automation based on that state's industrial mix in 1990 but assuming the robot-use by industry in European countries. 10 The U.S. and European country data to construct this instrument were collected by AR from the International Federation of Robots (for number of industrial robots), the EUKLEMS dataset (for number of workers by industry in Europe), and from the U.S. Census and the American Community Survey (for equivalent U.S. worker counts). This paper takes the robots/1,000 workers numbers by industry directly from Table A1 in AR.
The robots/1,000 workers ratio is observed for As with the automation measure, the trade data are calculated twice: once using Chinese import penetration in each U.S. industry, and once using import penetration in each industry in other developed countries, in both cases weighted by U.S. industry shares in 1990 (before the analysis period). 15 This procedure results in two measures, one based on other countries' import penetration, weighted by U.S. industry shares; and one based on U.S. industry-level penetration weighted by U.S. industry shares. As with automation, and following the approach in ADH, the U.S.-based measure is instrumented by the "other country" measure to avoid potential endogeneity of imports to local demand shocks (see next section for further details). These U.S.
11 A crosswalk is available from the authors upon request. 12 In calculating the European shares, the paper follows AR and uses the 30 th percentile of robot penetration by industry in Europe, which is empirically more predictive of U.S. industry robot penetration than the European mean. 13 To "interpolate" the 1994 U.S. value, robot penetration is assumed to have been 0 in the U.S. in 1980. Furthermore, since the last observed year is 2014, the 2015 values are assumed to have remained at their 2014 levels.data and the analysis exclude Alaska and Hawaii. However, Washington, DC is counted as a state.
Other Control Variables
Other controls used in the regressions are taken from the CPS Annual Social and Economic Supplement conducted each March. These include the share of workers in firms with over 1,000 employees, unionization rates, and the rate of offers of employer health insurance. 16 Furthermore, the 1990 shares of employment in each 3-digit industry used to construct the automation measure described above are also from the CPS. These shares are calculated using the March Supplement household weights to account for the sampling structure of the survey.
Data on Labor Earnings
Data on earnings come from the CWHS, a 1-percent sample of earnings of U.S. workers.
In the paper, the data are restricted to wage and salary earners in the years 1994 and 2015, ages 16 to 70, with at least $1 of annual earnings. Due to computational limitations in the regressions described below, these data are further restricted to a random 50 percent of the full sample, totaling 1.4 million person-year observations. The data contain the variables year of birth, year of death, gender, state of residence, and earnings. The earnings measure from the CWHS covers all earnings and deferred compensation (e.g., 401(k) contributions) subject to the payroll tax.
17 All dollar amounts are in constant 2015 dollars, adjusted by the CPI. Within each year, individuals are divided into 100 equal-sized bins, 16 While these variables provide proxies for other factors that may affect the taxable share -namely, increasing market concentration, decreasing worker bargaining power, and relative increases in non-wage compensation at the expense of cash wage growth -the measures are too flawed to rely upon to quantify these factors' effects due to measurement error and lack of clear identification of their impacts. 17 The earnings measure is not adjusted for two factors that could affect taxable earnings but are quantitatively small and irrelevant for estimation of top earner shares. The first is that workers who earned above the cap because they worked for multiple employers in the same year do not pay payroll taxes on their earnings above the cap, but the employer share of the tax is paid on all earnings. The second factor is that before 2001 military deemed wage credits are included in taxable earnings. To simplify the analysis it is assumed that both earnings above the cap and military deemed wage credits are entirely untaxed.
numbered from 1 to 100. 18 The mean of each of these bins is interpreted as the earnings percentile corresponding with the bin number.
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The first two rows of Table 1 
Instrumental Variables Quantile Regressions
The analysis calls for separate estimates of the impact of each factor of interest on different points in the earnings distribution. To estimate these regressions the analysis first follows the approach in AR and ADH, respectively, to isolate the plausibly exogenous variation in automation and trade. The concern with both these measures is that they may be driven by local shocks to supply and demand in the U.S., rather than being the drivers of such shocks. For example, the number of robots in a state could increase because of a decline in labor supply, rather than because technological change has made the use of robots more attractive to firms.
Similarly, Chinese imports may increase because demand for those goods has grown, rather than because of greater export capacity of Chinese firms.
21
As discussed in the data section, to circumvent some of these concerns, each of the two factors is measured in two ways: based on penetration by industry in other developed countries, and based on the actual penetration by industry in the United States. In both cases, the statelevel measure is calculated using the actual U.S. industry shares from 1990. With these two measures in hand, ordinary least-squares regressions of state-level differences between 1994 and 2015 of the following form are estimated. 22 They yield a measure of automation (trade) that would have resulted from the industrial robot (Chinese import) penetration predicted from the corresponding penetration in other countries:
where is either Robots or Imports, and the US superscript indicates that the variable is based on U.S. industry-level penetration while the Other superscript indicates the 21 As in AR and ADH, these instruments will not correct for bias stemming from global shocks to labor supply and product demand. 22 The analysis estimates these differences regressions following AR and ADH. Unlike in those papers, however, this is implemented through use of state fixed effects rather than first differences, since the second stage described below is estimated on a repeated cross-section of individuals, rather than a panel of geographical units. This produces identical coefficients to the state-level differences regressions, but imposes stronger assumptions on the structure of error terms. The standard errors of the coefficients estimated in these regressions should account both for the fact that two of the explanatory variables are themselves estimated, and for the fact that the variation driving these factors is at the state-year level rather than the individual level. Neither of these corrections is easily implementable in SAS, the statistical package used in the analysis. Therefore, the standard errors yielded by these regressions should be approached with caution, and the results below focus on point estimates. 23 Estimation of an instrument with OLS for use in a second-stage quantile regression follows the approach outlined in Hansen (2005, 2006) . In this context the preferred approach is a two-sample IV regression, since the first stages can be estimated on public data at the state level, and then matched to restricted individual-level data for the second stage. 24 This choice of the set of q is chosen to provide good resolution of the effect of each factor near the top of the earnings distribution, where there is greater variance with respect to the effects of each factor, and where small changes have disproportionate impacts on the taxable share.
The main results do not depend on including the potentially endogenous controls of unionization rates, rates of employer-sponsored health insurance offer, and share of workers in large firms. To assess whether the endogeneity of these variables is biasing the estimates of the effects of the other factors, the regressions are also estimated excluding these controls. The qualitative patterns of coefficient estimates for automation and trade are robust to this exclusion.
See figures A1 and A2 in the Appendix for figures illustrating this robustness.
Counterfactual Earnings Distributions and Taxable Shares
Once the coefficients on the two factors of interest are estimated for each quantile, they are scaled. This scaling is helpful because the two variables are measured on different dimensions, making it difficult to compare coefficients on their own. A natural scale to use in this regard is the factual change in each factor between 1994 and 2015. Thus the coefficients for all quantiles for each factor X are multiplied by the factor's change at the median of earnings between 1994 and 2015, ∆ .
Following the scaling, construction of counterfactual 2015 earnings distributions is straightforward. For any factor or combination of factors to be held at 1994 levels, the scaled coefficient of that factor for each quantile is subtracted from the corresponding 2015 quantile.
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Thus, the counterfactual 2015 earnings at quantile q holding a subset vector X of the two factors of interest at its 1994 levels is:
where , is the log of earnings at quantile q of the 2015 counterfactual distribution holding X constant; is the log of earnings at the qth quantile of the factual 2015 earnings distributions; and is the coefficient on X for the qth quantile.
Of course, the counterfactual earnings distribution may have different average earnings than the factual 2015 distribution, so the AWI would likely be different in the counterfactual scenario. The counterfactual would also have a different taxable maximum, because of the 25 To arrive at a finer resolution of earnings below the 80 th percentile, it is assumed that the coefficient of each factor for percentiles between the deciles is equal to the coefficient at the next decile. For example, the coefficients for the 4 th percentile are assumed to be the same as for the 10 th percentile. With the counterfactual taxable maximum in hand, the taxable share is calculated simply as the sum of taxable earnings divided by the sum of total earnings. Similarly, the top 1-percent's earnings share can be calculated by taking the ratio of the top 1-percent's earnings in either the factual or counterfactual distribution, divided by the appropriate sum of total earnings.
Results
This section presents the results on the effect of automation and trade on different points in the earnings distribution. It then applies those estimates to construct counterfactual earnings distributions in 2015 had one or both of these factors remained at their 1994 levels. Relying on these counterfactuals, the analysis decomposes the decline in the taxable share of earnings to the portion contributed by these factors in total, and by each in isolation, to assess how much of the increase in the top share of earnings, and the corresponding decline in the taxable share, is attributable to each factor.
Instrumental Variables Quantile Regression Estimates
Figures 3 and 4, respectively, show ∆ -that is, the estimated coefficient multiplied by the factor's change from 1994 to 2015 -for automation and for trade on different parts of the earnings distribution. 26 Both factors have negative effects on the vast majority of wage and salary earners. However, the patterns vary between the two factors in how they hit different parts of the distribution.
Automation had essentially no effect at the 10 th percentile. However, the effect rapidly turns negative further up the distribution, at -1.4 percent for the 20 th percentile, and then declines further, until reaching a nadir of -3.7 percent at the 90 th percentile. The effect then diminishes in absolute value, but remains negative until the 98 th percentile, where it is -3. Table A2 in the Appendix. Full results for other quantiles are available from the authors. 27 This figure is based on CPS data, which are top-coded for earnings. Thus, the displayed earnings deciles do not correspond precisely to the earnings distributions from the regression estimates; the top decile in the CPS data is roughly equivalent to the 9 th decile in the regression analysis. 28 The outcome measure of earnings considered in AR in somewhat different. The authors examine self-reported hourly wages rather than administrative annual earnings. Nevertheless, their findings are broadly similar regarding the negative impacts of automation across most of the wage distribution, though they find the most negative effects at the bottom of the distribution, with generally decreasing magnitude until the median, and then roughly constant towards the top. Their earnings data are top-coded and thus do not allow them to observe effects around the top 5-percent of earners, and they cannot speak to effects at the very top of the earnings distribution. The U-shaped pattern of automation's impact is consistent with the wage polarization effects of skill-biased technical change highlighted, for example, by Kearney (2006, 2008) ; Acemoglu and Autor (2011); around the 70 th percentile. In contrast with automation, the strongly negative effects of Chinese trade at the bottom of the distribution are sensible given that the types of goods imported from China tend to be produced by low-skill workers. 29 Further up the distribution the effect of trade grows less negative. Unlike automation, however, this trend leads trade to have a slightly positive impact on the top 1-percent of earners.
In total, automation and trade have lowered earnings throughout the distribution, but their joint impact declines with earnings percentile. The total effect is -11 percent at the 10 th percentile, -5.7 percent at the median, -5.1 percent at the 90 th percentile, and only -2.1 percent at the 99 th percentile. The disproportionately negative impacts at the bottom of the distribution have contributed to the growing share of earnings going to those above the taxable maximum, and to the top 1-percent of earners.
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The Counterfactual 2015 Earnings Distribution
Subtracting the estimated change in earnings due to any factor between 1994 and 2015 from every percentile in the 2015 earnings distribution yields a counterfactual earnings distribution under the assumption that the factor remained at its 1994 levels. Rows 3-5 of Table   1 29 In 2015 the top 10 categories of goods imported from China were, in descending order: cell-phones and other household goods; computers; computer accessories; telecommunications equipment; toys, games, and sporting goods; apparel, textiles, non-wool or cotton; furniture, household goods; other parts and accessories of vehicles; apparel, household goods -cotton; and household appliances (U.S. Census Bureau 2018). 30 This U-shaped impact of automation and the monotonically declining absolute impact of trade are quite robust across specifications and datasets. Similar patterns hold in the absence of controls, and in CPS data. See the Appendix for full results.
Note that these means do not imply that automation or trade have a negative effect on prosperity in general. The earnings measure employed does not account for capital income, which is likely to be directly increased by an increase in industrial robots. Likewise, the measure does not account for a general equilibrium effect either of these factors may have on the relative prices of consumer goods, besides holding the overall price level fixed through use of CPI adjusted dollars.
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This ranking of the factors in terms of their effect on mean earnings is different when considering impacts at different points in the distribution. For example, the bigger drag on earnings at the 25 th percentile is trade, while growth in automation had only a small effect on earnings at that percentile. The reverse is true at the 75 th percentile.
Implications for the Top 1-Percent Share of Earnings
Trade is the factor most responsible for the rise in the top 1-percent share of earnings, Furthermore, almost the entirety of the portion of the increase in the top 1-percent share that these factors can explain is due to trade with China, rather than industrial automation.
Automation alone accounts for only 1.6 percent of the increase in the top 1-percent share, while trade accounts for 14 percent. Important context for this finding is that the analysis considers only the labor earnings of wage and salary workers, not a broader measure of income from a more complete cross-section of the population that includes the self-employed. Furthermore, automation has impacted the extensive margin of labor more near the bottom of the earnings distribution than near the top (as shown, for example, in Acemoglu and Autor 2011) . The data in this paper only include workers with positive earnings, thus missing the fact that automation induces some people to leave the workforce altogether; if these individuals were included, income inequality would likely have grown by even more. It is probable that industrial robots' impact on a broader measure of income would show evidence of greater effects on top income shares and income inequality more generally.
In sum, the estimates imply that a substantial share of the growth in the top 1-percent share of earnings is attributable solely to trade with China. Considering that imports from China account for only one-fifth of U.S. imports, this estimate suggests that the effects of trade more broadly could account for a large part of the increase in the top 1-percent share over the last twenty years. 32 However, the share is probably not five times larger than just the Chinese import effect, as some increase in imports is likely due to increased demand in the U.S., which does not necessarily crowd-out local production. Furthermore, a large share of imports is from developed countries which may substitute for more skilled labor.
Implications for the Taxable Share
How have these changes to the earnings distribution affected the taxable share? The estimates suggest that the proliferation of industrial robots had a very small effect on the taxable What explains the large remaining share of the increase in the top 1-percent share, and the decline in the taxable share since 1994? As mentioned above, some of these changes are likely due to trade and automation through aspects not captured by the measures used in this analysis. Alternative hypotheses for drivers of top-earner shares, such as erosion of norms against extremely high compensation for executives, likely contribute to the unexplained portion of the 1-percent share, though they are probably less relevant to the top 5-percent share on which the taxable share relies.
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A more promising avenue for exploration of the top 5-percent share is the increase in non-wage compensation. The expected result of this increase is that as the cost of non-wage compensation, particularly health insurance benefits, climbed, earnings growth would slow. The difficulty in estimating this effect is that simple models (including results from this project reported in the Appendix) find a positive correlation between earnings and health insurance coverage, driven by unobservable job and worker characteristics -for example, "good jobs"
usually both pay well and offer health benefits. Causal estimates of the compensating differential of non-wage compensation are necessary to determine how the large increase in health insurance premiums has affected the taxable earnings distribution; these estimates are left for further research.
Conclusion
This paper estimates the impact of two major structural changes in the economy between The literature has offered many complementary explanations for the growth in inequality.
This paper accounts for two of those explanations and finds that trade, in particular, has played a material role in the increasing concentration of earnings, at least among wage and salary workers. Much remains to be studied on this topic, which is of first-order importance to the Social Security program, to the economy, and to society at large. 
